Maybe now’s the time for amateur hour at the CIA.
An excerpt from a Wall Street Journal editorial:
The CIA’s Iraq mistakes have been amply documented. But the agency’s career analysts also got their judgments of the Soviet Union’s condition badly wrong. The Ford Administration had the foresight to bring in outside experts to do a so-called Team B analysis of the Soviet threat in the 1970s, and they got it right.
General [Michael] Hayden … solicitously told Michigan Democrat Carl Levin he wasn’t “comfortable” with work done by former Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith. Contrary to Democratic folklore, Mr. Feith’s Office of Special Plans never “politicized” intelligence but functioned as a modern-day Team B, looking at intelligence products and asking questions of briefers. How could the briefers be so sure, for example, that Islamic radicals like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi couldn’t have strong links to the “secular” Hussein regime? General Hayden should have been asked to elaborate on why he is uncomfortable that analysts might have to explain how they arrive at certain conclusions.